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Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to provide a theoretical economic 
framework for the analysis of the competition policy implemented by the 
European Economic Community (EEC). The fundamental objective is to 
demonstrate that the EEC's actual approach to regulating restrictive 
business practices can be related to a concept of competition that is 
relevant and adequate for the analysis and expla n ation of competition 
policy in the EEC. The thesis is that a strong theoretical relationship 
can be shown to exist between EEC business regulation and the conceptual 
parallels in the theories on competition of J.A. Schumpeter and J.M. 
Clark. 
A United States Congressional inquiry into international antitrust 
legislation determined that EEC competition rules are designed to 
facilitate the control of abusive enterprise practices, not the 
proscription of restrictive business practices or concentrated market 
1 
structures per se. The finding implies that statutes affecting 
competition policy in the European community are based upon the control 
of abuse of power competition principles. Competition legislation which 
is founded upon the control of abuse principle mandates a significantly 
different competition policy than laws that are based upon the 
prohibition principle, which is the other common basis for rules which 
regulate anti-competitive . enterprise activities. 
The properties of the prohibition principle are that certain 
restrictive business practices are prohibited per se, and in addition, 
the acquisition of dominant or monopoly power is proscribed. 2 Countries 
which base their competition policy upon the prohibition of per se 
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principle do not usually require a case-by-case determination of whether 
potential social or economic benefits mitigate the economic costs of 
competition-distorting practices. 
Richard Leftwich asserts that for countries such as the United 
States which employ the prohibition principle in their enforcement of 
antitrust legislation the model of perfect competition provides the norm 
for evaluating business practices. He states, "Presumably it [the 
theory of perfect competition] underlies the philosophy and enforcement 
of the Sherman Act of 1890 ••• , government regulation of public utilities 
and many other public policy measures." 3 
Since the model of perfect competition is credited with being the 
underlying economic justification for the prohibition principle, it is 
necessary to develop a theoretical economic rationale for competition 
policy like the EEC's, which is based upon the control of abuse 
principle. 
The essence of the control of abuse of power competition principle 
is that restrictive business practices or firms with dominant market 
positions can be rationally overseen to achieve the most socially 
beneficial use of resources. 4 Competition legislation and policy that 
is based upon the abuse principle allows exemptions from prohibitions on 
anti-competitive activities when restrictive business practices and 
agreements, which limit competition between firms, enhance economic 
efficiency or are likely to produce new or improved products. A further 
requirement is that the benefits which result be shared with ultimate 
consumers. Basically, under this type of competition policy, the 
criterion for determining the acceptability of anti-competitive 
arrangements is economic performance, and not merely .the existence of 
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concerted practices or concentrated economic power. Authorities which 
carry out competition policy must therefore employ a balancing logic in 
order to determine if the existing or potential economic benefits to 
society outweigh the detrimental effects of less competition. An 
important factor which is included on this economic balance sheet is the 
possibility of long-run improvements in production efficiency that might 
mitigate some of the short-run imperfections of restrictive business 
practices. 
The theories of competition of Schumpeter and Clark provide a solid 
foundation in economic theory for the control of abuse principle in 
competition legislation and policy. Further, the rules and policy 
implemented by the EEC are exemplary of the principle. Thus, ,, a unique 
theoretical economic model can be presented for the analysis and 
explanation of competition policy in the European Community. 
The Literature 
Several studies exist that present plausible rationales for EEC 
competition policy. Typically they explain EEC legislation and regulatory 
action as a function of pragmatic socioeconomic considerations. Little, 
if any, effort is exerted to relate .policy and practice to a theoretical 
economic model. 
Angulo and Minshall (1964) explicate competition policy in the 
United States and the EEC by theorizing that the acceptability of 
business practices is determined by authorities on the basis of 
nationalistic economic and political objectives. 5 The authors -speculate 
that the national economic concern for geopolitical economic power and 
the economic needs necessitated by various stages of economic 
development affect the focus of a nation's competition policy. 
3 
The study's findings indicate that when the theorem is applied to 
the EEC, the advantages of industrial concentration respond to the EEC 
economic needs more suitably than unfettered competition. Angulo and 
Minshall conclude that as a result of the economic needs created by the 
desire in the EEC to improve its trade balance, the rapidly expanding 
economies in the Common Market at the time of the research, and the lack 
of inherent fear of large firms in Europe, EEC regulatory policies are 
favorable toward the existence of firms with significant market power. 
Clock and Lee (1975) present general economic philosophies which 
. 6 
they assert have influenced EEC business regulation. The "economic 
cooperation" and "economic moderation" schools of thought are set up as 
partial detenninants of antitrust action in the EEC. 
The economic philosophy of the cooperation .school is that the 
advantages of economies of scale typically associated with industries 
that have small numbers of stable, protected, large firms should be 
encouraged. The view holds that to promote effective competition 
between large multinationals, a few monolithic firms are necessary in 
each industry. The benefits of promoting the development of large-scale 
industrial structures are envisioned as lower-cost corporate financing, 
and increased profits which should foster technological progress. 
Although the authors are critical of the EEC Commission and Court of 
J ustice for utilizing the cooperation concept, they suggest the 
philosophy has significantly influenced EEC policy. 
Clock and Lee maintain that in the early 1970s EEC policy began to 
change from wholesale approval of highly concentrated industry 
arrangements to guarded enthusiasm for additional concentration. The 
indication of ·this less-than-blanket acceptance of cooperation 
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agreements was the EEC Statement of May 27, 1970. The statement 
exempted agreements between firms with less than 5 percent o~ _their 
product market from competition legislation and implied that agreements 
between firms with more than 5 percent would have to be notified to the 
C . . 7 EE Comm.J.SSJ.On. Thus, the authors postulate that the logic of economic 
moderation impacted EEC antitrust policy. 
The findings of the study are that EEC authorities who deal with 
competition matters now attempt to achieve a balance between the 
benefits that scale economies offer with the anti-competitive effects 
created by restraints of trade. Clock and Lee conclude that a more 
specific set of economic criteria .is necessary to measure the impact 
that agreements have on net market efficiency if optimal economic and 
social results are to be ascertained from EEC policy. 
The Schumpeter-Clark Model 
In this section the main currents of Schwnpeter's theory of 
"creative destruction" and Clark's "workable competition" are isolated, 
shown to be remarkably similar, and integrated into a framework for -the 
explanation of EEC competition policy. The visions of capitalist 
competition expressed by Schumpeter and Clark provide theoretical 
underpinnings for regulatory action that stresses the control of 
restrictive business practices. The two mainstream economists contend 
that effective competition can be achieved if society recognizes that: 
1. static models of competition are inappropriate norms for assessing 
business practices: 2. long-run dynamic factors, e.g., new products or 
technologies, can mitigate the immediate costs of restrictive practices: 
and 3. competition policymakers should employ a case-by-case evaluation 
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of anti-competitive activities to facilitate the social and economic 
benefits of dynamic progressiveness. 
Once the Schumpeter-Clark model is formalized, · explanatory power 
for European Community competition policy is demonstrated. 
Background of Creative Destruction and Workable Competition 
Competition in the capitalist system is presented as a process of 
creative destruction in Schumpter's 1942 publication Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy. 8 The purpose of the treatise is to demonstrate 
the inevitability of the emergence of a socialist economy because of the 
decomposition of capitalist society. The theory of creative destruction 
facilitates the prediction of capitalism's demise because it is 
indicative of the rationalist mentality inherent in the system. 
Basically, capitalism develops rationality and the cost-profit calculus 
which propels the logic of enterprise. However, a by-product of the 
rationalistic attitude is a critical mindset which eventually attacks 
and undermines the economic system. 
Schumpeter describes capitalist competition as a process of 
creative destruction because continuous change from within business 
enterprises is envisioned. Incessant revolution takes place inside 
firms and industries as old methods and products are supplanted by 
improved technologies and differentiated output. In light of the 
existence of creative destruction, survival in the arena of capitalist 
competition requires firms to perpetually strive to: 1. develop more 
efficient .production methods; 2. improve product quality; and/or 3. 
create an enti~ely new product or service. The systematic destruction 
of the old and creation of the new has important implications for the 
regulation of enterprise activities. 
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The impetus for J.M. Clark's explanation of effective capitalist 
competition is much different than Schumpeter's. Clark is virtually 
indifferent to the overall question of the continued existence or 
disintegration of modern industrial societies. Instead his analysis is 
a response to the perceived intellectual shortcomings of the theories of 
imperfect competition. 
The principles of Clark's effective competition appear in his 1940 
. l d ' d f kabl · · "9 paper ent1t e . Towar A Concept o Wor e Competition. He states 
that his article: 
••• is an attempt to find an escape from the negative 
conclusions stemming from the Chamberlin-Robinson group of 
theories, in which it appears that all feasible fonns of 
competition in industry and trade are defective, fran the 
standpoiflt of the services competition is supposed to 
render. 
The predominant ob j ective of Clark's theory of workable competition 
is to encourage the development of realistic and desirabie concepts of 
competition, from those that are practically possible, within the limits 
set by conditions that are inescapable. Further, he emphasizes that the 
acceptability, or workability, of an industry should be determined on 
the basis of careful economic analysis of the structure of the industry; 
the behavior of the firms which make up the industry; and industrial 
performance. 
Views of Static Models 
A fundamental principle in both the process of creative destruction 
and workable competition is an emphasis on the dynamic characteristics 
of the competition process. The capitalist economy that Schumpeter 
perceives is characterized by incessant change from within - destroying 
the old vestiges of competitive advantages and crating new ones. 
7 
Schumpeter stresses that such a process necessitates models and theories 
of competition which account for the impact of innovation over time. 
Similarly, Clark maintains that economic activity, as well as the 
psychology of economics, should realistically be analyzed from a dynamic 
perspective. Both economists assert that precisionist models, aimed at 
the mathematical determination of static equilibrimn, create an overly 
mechanistic view of the economy and overlook possible social benefits 
made possible by changing economic conditions. 
Schumpeter is not satisfied with economic theory which is directed 
toward the mere analysis of how capitalism administers existing 
structures. He defines capitalism as "a form or ·method of economic 
change" that never has been and never will be stationary. 11 He 
describes capitalism as an evolutionary process, one which is 
characterized by incessant revolution from within. 
He is critical of theorists who use fragments of this reality and 
attempt to generalize conclusions about the functioning of ·capitalism 
from limited observations. Once Schumpeter explains capitalism to be an 
ever-changing economic system, the interpretation of its institutions 
requires dynamic methods of analysis. To facilitate such analysis, he 
argues that it is pointless to - evaluate capitalist performance from a 
static point in time. Rather, since it takes considerable time for the 
process to manifest its true features and effects, it is better to judge 
economic performance .over time. He states that: 
A system - any system, economic or other - that at every given 
point of time fully utilizes its possibilities to the best 
advantage may yet in the long-run be inferior to a system that 
. does so at no point in time, because the latter's failure to 
do so may be 1~ condition for the level or speed of long-run performance. 
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In order for society to have the opportunity to benefit from the 
dynamic progressiveness of capitalist competition, the performance of 
an enterprise must be evaluated on factors other than the price and 
quantity features that are focused upon in static models. In 
Schumpeter's view a realistic measure of competition must include 
contributions to new technologies, new products, and new types of 
industrial organization. Further, he argues that if perfect competition 
existed, it would not result in the ·most efficient use of resources •. 
He declares that the existence of perfectly competitive firms would most 
likely result in wasted opportunities and resources because of their 
inability to judge and take advantage of new methods of production and 
profitable investments. 
Another fallacy of the model of perfect competition according to 
Schumpeter is that it assumes easy entry into any industry. Yet, when 
new products or new methods of production are introduced, firms may not 
be able to readily enter the field of competition. He also recognizes 
that economic profits acquired through business strategy are eliminated, 
or competed away, according to the model of perfect competition. Any 
attempt to maintain surplus profits is "inimical to growth of total 
13 
output. However, Schumpeter stresses the necessity of such profits in 
the process of capitalist evolution, and adds that "perfect competition 
is not only impossible but inferior, and has no title to being set up as 
d 1 f 'd l ff' . 1114 a mo e o i ea e iciency. 
In Clark's view, neither the model of perfect competition nor the 
models of imperfect competition expounded in the 1930s are appropriate 
guidelines for competition policy. · Nevertheless, he applauds the 
theorists of imperfect competition for their attempt at making economic 
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models more relevant to modern experience. He believes their emphasis 
on the effects of large firm size, small numbers of producers, and 
differentiated products is pertinent and useful. However, he asserts 
that an analysis using graphical models, of which the aim and end is the 
mathematically precise definition of a state of stable equilibriwn, 
leads away from increased realism. He states that "this static 
character, plus the requirements of mathematical precision ••• impose 
limitations on the extent to which these models can reflect the behavior 
of actual, dynamic economic situations and the forces that operate on 
th ,.15 em. 
Clark deals primarily with the fallacies he perceives in the models 
of imperfect competition developed by Chamberlin and Robinson. However, 
he does state that the use of the standard of perfect competition cannot 
"afford reliable guidance to the factors which are favorable to the 
closest working approximation of that ideal under actual conditions. 1116 
He charges that equilibrium conditions of perfect competition eliminate 
progress by assumption. In his view, the model brings forth an 
inescapable conclusion, namely: 
••• this allegedly desirable condition is something nobody 
really wants, including the theorists whose models impliedly 
set it up as a desideratum. They do not want techniques to be 
static or diversity of products to be wiped out, and complete 
homogeneity of product' would threaten competition worse than 
differentiation does. 
Clark's critique of Robinson and Chamberlin's works focuses upon · 
the absence of dynmnic considerations which Clark believes ameliorate 
the pessimistic predictions of imperfect competition. He points out 
that it is quite possible that firms with market power and a measure of 
control over prices can perform well enough to be considered adequate 
and reliable forms of actual competition. 
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The long-run, dynamic forces, which Clark believes mitigate the 
unfavorable results of higher than competitive prices and restricted 
output predicted by models of monopolistic competition, are the 
potential for both more competition and an increased number of 
substitute products. He notes that neither factor is individually 
capable of offsetting monopolistic tendencies, but he submits that, in 
concert, they might comes close to a perfect check on such activities. 
Clark's fundamental proposition is that demand and cost curves in 
the · long-run and much more elastic than short-run curves, and 
considerably more elastic than the ones used in the diagrammatic 
expositions of theories of imperfect competition. Clark states that he 
expects "the apparent seriousness of Professor Chamberlin's results 
derives from ••• the exaggerated steepness of the curves he used to 
illustrate them." 18 
The development of substitutes over time represents, in Clark's 
view, a dynamic factor which results in more elastic demand schedules 
and reduces the seriousness of imperfections that theories of 
monopolistic competition suggest. In a comment on the importance of 
innovation reminiscent of Schumpeter, Clark points out that competition 
between .substitutes is possibly the most formidable kin d of rivalry 
because it can threaten the existence of an entire industry. He 
suggests tha t the development of substitute goods is so pronounced and 
inevitable in the capitalistic economy that it should be viewed as a 
form of competition itself. , 
The awareness that potential competition can materialize prevents 
enterprise, in Clark's opinion, from pursuing an "unduly grasping policy 
in regard to price, and an unduly restrictive po l icy as to output." 19 
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Clark insists that static models portray businessmen as totally 
preoccupied with the short-run maximization of profits. Although he 
recognizes that businessmen do not possess perfect foresight, he 
believes that decision-makers in industry are aware that substantial 
short-run profits eventually attract new competitors. 
The essence of Clark's position is that the emphasis of competition 
theories must be changed from one which views competition as a mechanism 
of equilibrium to one which explains competition as a dynamic process. 
If this position is accepted, it is possible to understand his 
presumption that "competitive forces persist more pervasively and 
effectively than existing theories typically assume." 20 
The Impact of Dynamic Economic Factors 
Schurnpeter and Clark maintain that the development over time of new 
products, or commodities of better quality, or more technologically 
advanced methods of production should be acknowledged as compensatory 
effects of short-run restrictive practices. They insist that the type 
of competition that generates these results is the most desirable since 
decisive cost or quality advantages are afforded society. Furthermore, 
in their view, such improvements in products or production techniques 
strike at the foundation and very lives of firms with significant power. 
The process of creative destruction, Schumpeter insists, unremittingly 
reduces the concentration of market power and ultimately produces price 
and output levels near the competitive optimum. In fact, he suggests in 
the long-run that behavior is very similar to the perfectly competitive 
21 pattern. Several tenable arguments are presented to j ustify 
Schumpeter's position that anti-competitive arrangements have redeeming 
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social and economic features. In the gale of creative destruction 
restrictive practices acquire a new meaning. He asserts that the 
materialization of the threat of new products and technologies is 
sufficient to reduce the "long-run scope and importance of practices 
that aim, through restricting output, at conserving established 
positions and at maximizing the profits accruing from them." 22 Also, he 
suggests that practices which appear in the individual case to be 
restrictive may do a great deal to "steady the ship" during the 
expansions and contractions of business cycles. In particular, some 
restrictive arrangement~ prevent resource dislocation and large numbers 
of business failures. He states: 
we may assume that the refusal to lower prices strengthens the 
position of the industries which adopt that policy either by 
increasing their revenue or simply by avoiding chaos in their 
markets ••• it may make fort 23sses out of what otherwise might be centers of devastation. . 
In other words, firms with some degree of price control may be able to 
maintain total output and employment at higher levels than would be 
possible if complete price flexibility exist. 
Also, because Schumpeter describes capitalism as a system of 
incessant change from .within - a sort of innovative competition - he 
views certain protective devices and strategies a.s imperative for 
survival in the capitalist order. 
The nature of the system, which constantly induces the introduction 
of new commodities and techniques, necessitates certain protective 
measures. Schumpeter considers patents, restraints on the dissemination 
of production technique information, and long-run contracts as essential 
to insure the continuation of investment under the constantly changing 
conditions of capitalism. He points out that, in reality, such 
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generally accepted practices are not different, only special cases, from 
the class of restrictive practices held in such contempt by theorists 
and politicians. 
He admits that if restrictive enterprise activities are viewed 
statically vis-a-vis a model of perfect competition they . appear • to be 
detrimental to social utility because of higher prices or smaller 
quantities of output. However, Schumpeter maintains that these 
strategies or practices should be viewed as part of a long-run process 
of expansion and development of the capitalist system. He suggests that 
if restrictive practices are viewed from this perspective they can be 
judged as protecting rather than impeding economic and technical 
progress. 
Another reason why the conclusion that firms with market power 
inevitably restrict output is unacceptable to Schumpeter is that such 
enterprises "largely create what they exploit. 1124 The argument is that 
it is irrational to condemn firms with the financial ability or 
entrepreneurial talent to crea.te new products. These enterprises expand 
total output when they produce the new or improved commodity which they 
have developed. 
The process of creative destruction .also has an impact on the price 
strategies of firms. Since innovation is indigenous to Sch~peter's 
vision of capitalist competition, he avers that "price rigidity is 
ess .entially a short-run phenomenon. There are no instances of long-run 
rigidity of prices. 1125 He explains that the rational cost-profit 
calculus which drives capitalism eventually brings forth a new product 
or production method which reduces the market power of its competition 
and forces prices down. In other words, the process of 
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creative destruction insures that the fruits of technological i nnovation 
are passed along to consumers. 
A conclusion similar to Schumpeter's regarding the acceptability of 
anti-competitive business practice is reached by J.M. Clark in his 
concept of workable competition. In his famous article Clark contends 
t hat businessmen want to avoid attracting new competitors so it is 
unlikely they will pursue the highly restrictive, short-run price and 
output strategies that static models of imperfect competition demonstrate. 
He further argues that the constant introduction of substitute products 
results in more elastic demand schedules and, consequently, price and 
output levels close to the ideal of perfect compe,tition. Thus, he 
expl~ins that competition is "more pervasive and ever present than 
conunonly believed." 26 
Business . awareness that the probability of new competitors 
increases when restrictive short-run price and output strategies are 
pursued forces sellers to behave in a manner that is more farsighted. 
Clark points out that many businessmen believe it is good business to 
expand their output and sales volume and, thus, avoid "unduly grasping" 
profit-maximizing ~trategies • 
. The serious, derogatory results demonstrated by Chamberlin's model 
of imperfect competition are the product of the exaggerated steepness 
used to illustrate product demand according to ·c1ark. He states that 
the abstraction of a timeless demand schedule neglects the elasticity 
increasing impact of potential competition and substitute goods. It is 
highly possible, in his view, that the effects of these factors in the 
long-run force the demand schedule for most products to approach 
infinite elasticity, and thus reduces or eliminates the difference 
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between price and output levels of imperfect competition and those of 
the perfectly competitive ideal. According to Clark, the conditions of 
workable competition reduce the discrepancies between long-run and 
short-run results so that levels closer to the "ideal" are achieved. 
Although no specific standards are presented by Clark to judge the 
abuse of economic power, some degree of price con~rol is considered 
beneficial to effective competition. The positive characteristics of 
price control are: 1. it allows reward for the technological progress 
and product development; and 2. price flexibility "affords a stimulus to 
27 demand in dull times, and the reverse in boom times." 
Innovations in technology or products improve the performance of 
imperfect competition, and the inherent sloped demand curve is seen as 
imperative to reward the risk and cost of innovation. Actually Clark 
alleges that the advent of innovations or improvements in quality 
enhances effective competition because the accompanying competitive 
advantages provide a stimulus . for others in the industry to improve 
their productive efficiency or to increase the attractiveness of their 
product. 
The ability to affect prices implied by negatively sloped demand 
curves also produce stabilization benefits for the economy. Clark 
submits that effective competition requires "an individual demand curve 
with sufficient slope to bring price, on the average, far enough above 
marginal cost so that average cost may be covered over the run of good 
times and bad." 28 Thus, he concludes that workab1e competition has some 
positive use for the sloping individual demand curve. 
In swmnary Clark maintains that competition between even a few 
sellers will in the long-run approximate the results of perfect 
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competition, and short-run practices result in considerably less 
restrictive price and output levels than theorized. Clark predicts 
these outcomes because he believes businessmen rationally pursue price 
and output strategies .that try to avoid attracting rivals, and that 
expand their sales volume and market share - even at the expense of 
short-run profits. Essentially, to have a system of workable 
compet i t i on the effects of ever-changing long-run factors must be 
considered. It is these dynamic, long-run effects which mitigate the 
seriousness of short-run results under imperfect competition. 
The Role of Competition Policy 
Three parallel themes exist in Schumpeter and Clark's views of 
capita l ist competition which require consideration in decisions that 
regulate business enterprises. First, innovation is stressed as the 
most effective kind of competition. Next, a degree of price control is 
advanced as necessary to stimulate and reward technological research and 
development. Finally, they contend over the long-run .restrictive 
practices may afford economic stabilization benefits to society. 
Consequently, it is their position that the effects o·f these dynamic . 
practices must be estimated when business activities are evaluated. 
· schumpeter submits that the competition which counts the most is 
"from the new ·comnodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, 
the new type of organization (the largest-scale unit of control for 
instance) - competition which strikes not at the margins of the profits 
and the outputs of the existing fims but at the .ir foundations and their 
very lives. 1129 He maintains competition policy should decide the 
acceptability of enterprise positions and activities on their ability to 
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contribute to the development of the economy over time. In his view, 
considerations other than static comparisons of price-quantity relation-
ships are important. Factors such as the likelihood of increasing 
social welfare from new or improved products, or contributions to 
technical progress, or an improved source of supply are identified as 
worthy considerations. The implementation of policy in this manner 
contributes, in Schumpeter's opinion, to the organic development of the 
capitalist economy. 
Clark, like Schumpeter, recognizes the importance of innovation. 
He defines it as the utilization of applied science to the competitive 
forces of a thoroughly dynamic economy. Clark emphasizes the import of 
innovation in much the same way as Schumpeter does. Clark believes that 
the significance of innovation is in the new forms it creates; the new 
kinds of things it does; the new organizational sponsorship it necessi-
tates; and the new "enabling conditions" it creates. 30 Furthermore, 
Clark asserts that when innovation facilitates th .e developnent of 
substitutes it may promote the most formidable kind of competition -
that which can threaten the existence of an entire industry. 
The possibility that cooperative agreements between firms might 
facilitate technological progress should also be considered in Clark's 
opinion. Although the agreements conceivably reduce competition between 
firms, Clark argues they promote the introduction of closer and more 
general substitutes. He recognizes that such anti-competitive 
arrangements have the effect of increasing the co:ncentration of 
industry. However, he contends that large-scale production has the 
characteristics of fairly healthy and workable, imperfect competition. 
Clark expresses hope that in these cases government will •not assume the 
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burden of doing something about every departure from the model of 
f . . "31 per ect compet1t1on. 
Schumpeter was avidly against antitrust ideology which emphasizes 
attacking the existence of significant market power (the ability to 
maintain a price greater than marginal cost) or restrictive business 
practices without considering the role such positions, practices, and 
strategies play in the process of economic devel0:pment. He admits that 
there are some cases of anti-competitive business practices which may 
prove detrimental to long-run output. However, he contends that 
competition authorities should not uncritically assume that all 
practices, which appear anti-competitive, are injurious to long-run 
development. This position can be interpreted as an argument against 
ruling enterprise activities illegal per se. However, Schumpeter does 
not argue against all state regulation. For instance, he observes that 
it is possible for a cartel system to sabotage all progress or to 
accomplish the same results as perfect competition with smaller social 
and private costs. This possibility, he believes, shows "that there is 
no general case for indiscriminate trust-busting or for the prosecution 
32 
of everything that qualifies as a restraint of trade." 
The type of regulatory philosophy that Schumpeter advocates for 
regulatory authorities to pursue is what he calls a rational instead of 
a vindictive competition policy. Although no explicit detail is given 
concerning how a rational policy can be implemented_, the statement 
condemning indiscriminate trust-busting implies that concentrated 
industries and restrictive practices should be regulated to facilitate 
the social and economic benefits of innovation. 
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The most precise elaboration of the competition policy necessary to 
promote effective competition is made by J.M. Clark. He maintains that 
a case-by-case method of determining whether enterprise activities 
satisfactorily meet competition criteria is the appropriate approach for 
authorities to employ. He notes that a balanced evaluation of competition 
is "one in which the aspects of productive techniques, improved and 
differentiated products, and price all play a part. 1133 Clark's belief 
in the relevance of pragmatic analysis necessitates that behavior be 
analyzed in light of many diverse, realistic variables. When such logic 
is extended to the criteria for identifying effective competition he 
states: 
••• the case-by-case type of study does not mean that the 
concepts of general theory play no part. They are used and 
useful. But it does mean that no one or two such concepts can 
be counted on to dominate a particular situation; and that the 
facts of the case must be appealed to in trying to decide how 
important any one factor is. To put it briefly, the concepts 
of theory suggest some of the things a student should look 
for; but he also needs to be 31ooking for other things and be prepared for the unexpected. 
The approach that Clark advocates is one which determines the 
legality · of enterprise activities on the basis of practices judged 
desirable and those judged harmful from a competitive standpoint. He 
calls the prohibitionary antitrust policy approach a negative method of 
implementing policy, but observes that · it has some ·value if offenses are 
defined and firms are told what to do to rectify their violations. 
Therefore, appropriate competition policy under Clark's theory of 
competition would not automatically attack the acquisition or existence 
of substantial market power. 
The theories of the two economists on effective capitalist 
competition provide a theoretical framework for the economic analysis of 
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competition policy which does not automatically condemn concentrated 
market structures or restrictive business practices. The principles of 
their concepts of acceptable competition establish a basis for competition 
policy which utilizes a case-by-case evaluation of enterprise practices 
and market positions to determine if imperfections can make positive 
economic or social contributions. Competition policy directed at the 
control of the abusive use of economic power, and not at the existence 
or acquisition of power, . is theoretically rationalized on the basis of 
Schumpeter's and Clark's competition theories. 
The next section indicates that EEC competition policy is 
representative of this type of approach. 
EEC Competition Policy: Theory and Practice 
Introduction 
The rules and regulations which facilitate the implementation of 
competition policy in the European Community are presented in this 
section and several relevant cases are examined. The analysis of 
competition statutes and •important precedents will indicate that ·EEC 
policy is primarily designed to control the abuse of economic power, and 
is consequently rationalized by the Schumpeter-Clark model of 
competition • 
On March 25, 1957, -~he Benelux countries, France, Germany; and 
Italy, signed the Treaty of Rome and established ·the European Economic 
Community. The Treaty came into force on April 1, 1958. Since 1958, 
Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and Greece have joined the Conmmnity. 
. . 
The EEC extended the common market principles of the European Coal 
and Steel Community by abolishing quotas on goods and services, by 
21 
eliminating obstacles to the free movement of people and capital, and 
creating institutions with supranational powers. In the area of 
competition rules, the ECSC set the precedent for Community competition 
rules (Articles 85 and 86) by establishing Articles 65 and 66 in the 
Paris Treaty. 
The importance of effective ~ompetition is set out early in the 
Rome Treaty. Article 3(F) states that the Community must promote the 
"institution of a system ensuring that competition in the Camnon Market 
is not distorted." 35 Articles 85 and 86 are perceived to be necessary, 
as both Schuman and Monnet had earlier realized, to prevent private 
accwnulations of power from restricting competition where national trade 
and tariff barriers are eliminated. In other words, Articles 85 and 86 
are designed to eliminate public trade barriers and abusive practices of 
powerful private enterprises which would .otherwise prevent or distort 
free trade among member states. 
The basic aim of the EEC is to eliminate barriers to free trade, 
and to form a vast single market for all goods. Thus, competition 
provisions are inte'bded to promote the accomplishment of these goal _s and 
advance the "four freedoms:" freedom of movement of goods, services, 
persons and capital. 
The Commission of the European Economic Community, after advisement 
from the Committee on Competition, has issued a statement of the basic 
objectives of EEC competition policy. They state: 
The first objective is to help create and maintain a single, 
common market for the benefit of business and consumers: it 
has been felt from the outset that the market which the Treaty 
aims to establish would be made impossible if, while conven-
tional trade barriers among the member states were speedily 
reduced, obstacles to trade resulting from private agreements 
and abuses of d011linant position were allowed to remain. 
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The second objective is to prevent large companie •s from 
abusing their economic power. 
The third objective is to induce firms to rationalize 
production and distribut!gn and to keep up with technical and 
scientific developments. 
The objectives specified by the Commission indicate that competition 
policy in the EEC is concerned with the encouragement of investment and 
the modernization of industry. The statement suggests that regulation 
of concerted practices and economic power is preferred over complete 
proscription of restrictive practices or the existence of a dominant 
position. 
EEC Competition Regulations 
Regulation 17 was adopted by the Council of the EEC on February 6, 
1962, and came in force March 13, 1962. 37 The Regulation was the 
Council's response to the mandates of Article 87 of the Rome Treaty 
which gave the Couricil three years from the time the Treaty went into 
effect to "adopt any appropriate regulations or directives to give 
effect to the principles set out in Articles 85 and 86." 38 Prior to the 
adoption of Regulation 17, competition authorities in member states were 
responsible for the application of Articles 85 and 86. 
The basic function of Regulation 17 .is to provide for a "comprehen-
sive administrative machinery for the uniform application and enforcement 
of a coherent competition policy.• 39 The preamble states that "some 
[restrictive agreements) have special features which may make them less 
40 prejudiced to the development of the common market." Thus, the 
Council recognized in the first regulation to implement Articles 85 and 
86 that the evaluation of enterprise practices must balance economic 
objectives against the degree of competition. 
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The Regulation confers exclusive authority upon the EEC Comnission 
to investigate complaints concerning anti-competitive activities. It 
also establishes procedures for fir:ms to notify the Comnission when they 
are contemplating entering into an agreement which may violate the 
Treaty. Upon notification, the Comnission is capable of reviewing 
enterprise agreements and determining if the agreement is in fact 
covered by Article 85 or 86; if the agreement is a violation of the 
Articles; or if it can qualify for an exemption under Article 85(3). if 
the Conmission feels there is no violation of the Treaty, than a negative 
clearance can be issued. If it determines that an agreement is in 
violation of the Treaty, but it meets the criteria of Article 85(3), an 
individual exemption can be granted. 
When the CODmlission determines that an individual exemption or 
negative clearance is not warranted, it has the power to declare the 
agreement invalid. Failure to align agreements with EEC rules, or to 
discontinue anti-competitive practices can result in fines which may 
range from 1,000 to 1,000,000 European currency units, or a sum of up to 
ten percent of the participating firms' previous year's turnover. The 
Conmission may also levy fines of from 50 to 1,000 European currency 
units on a daily basis for non-compliance. 
Decisions by the Commission are subject to review by the European 
Court of Justice. However, the Court will hear such appeals only when 
it can be shown that the Commission has exercised a lack of competence, 
violated an essential procedural requirement, or misused its powers. 
Upon the review of a Commission decision, the Court of Justice has the 
jurisdiction to "cancel, reduce, or increase the fine or periodic 
l . d "41 pena ty impose. 
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In the SAFCO (72/23) and CHEVRON (75/95) cases the Commission 
recognized that enterprises had entered into agreements which restricted 
competition in the produce retailing and oil refining industries. 
However, based upon the facts before it at the time, the Commission 
found that trade between ~ember states was not substantially restricted 
and issued a negative clearance, i.e., no violation of the Treaty 
existed. 
Regulation 17 authorizes the EEC Commission as the only institution 
in the Common Market capable of issuing an individual exemption from the 
competition rules of Article 85(1). The ability to grant an individual 
exemption under the conditions set out in Article 85(3) is particularly 
indicative of the discretionary powers granted to the Commission. 
Article 85 of the Rome Treaty presents the first rule that must be 
adhered to by firms co~peting in the Corrmon Market. Paragraph (1) of 
the Article states that all agreements or concerted practices between 
enterprises which prevent, restrict, or distort competition between 
member states are prohibited as incompatible with the Common Market. 
However, paragraph (3) of the Article 85 mandates that the prohibitions 
declared in paragraph (1) may be inapplicable if .the agreement or 
concerted practice "contributes to improving the production or distri-
bution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while 
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit •••• "42 
In order to implement Article 85 the Commission must ~ploy a 
"balancing logic" to determine if restrictive practices warrant an 
individual exemption. The evaluation process is analogous to the "rule 
of reason" approach which has developed under United States antitrust 
law. AJ'l important difference in the Common Market is that the entire 
burden of proof does not rest entirely on the undertakings seeking the 
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exemption from competition rules. The Court of Justice decided in the 
Grunding-Consten (64/566) case that the Commission must use the full 
extent of its resources to establish if there are grounds for an 
individual exemption under Article 83 (3). In every case that a 
violation of Article 85 (1) is determined, the Commission considers 
whether there are sufficient grounds for issuing an individual 
exemption. 
In effect, the approach legislated under Article 85 requires the 
Commission to draw up an "economic balance sheet." On one side, the 
actual or potential loss to society resulting from fewer producers or 
concerted practices must be considered. The perceived costs may be the 
traditional ones that market power or dominance generate, i.e.; the 
ability to control prices to some degree and to limit the quantity 
of output produced. other factors which could increase social costs are 
the ability of powerful firms or anti-competitive agreements to limit 
the entry of competitors in the future and/or to restrict technological 
development. Also, the Commission must determine whether anti-competitive 
arrangements undermine the objectives of a unified single market. 
Virtually all of the possible costs from restrictive enterprise 
agreements Dl\lSt be carefully considered before an arrangement between 
firms can be authorized. 
The realized or potential improvements for the Common Market 
economy must be entered on the social benefit side of the Commission's 
hypothetical "economic balance sheet." Obviously, agreements which 
reduce competition between producers but have a considerable likelihood 
of reducing user prices or increasing product supply are viewed as 
highly beneficial to the Community. 
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The Commission recognizes other beneficial results which might 
arise from collusive or restrictive enterprise activities that go beyond 
mere price and output considerations. A willingness has been 
demonstrated repeatedly by the Commission to include the multi-dimensional 
character of consumer welfare. This has been done by accepting anti-
competitive agreements which are likely to result in the production of a 
new or improved product. 
In its decisions the Commission has identified the potential and 
existing benefits for consumers created by business agreements. One way 
cited repeatedly, which consumers stand to benefit from enterprise 
agreements, is lower product prices. Agreements which limit competition 
between firms, but rationalize or increase the specialization of the 
production process are most likely to result in lower user prices. The 
Jaz-Peter (69/242) application, which has been exempted twice by the 
Commission, was considered likely to reduce clock prices because of 
. 1 · . 43 specia ization. The Henkel-Colgate (72/241) joint research and 
development agreemen~ was authorized by the Commission because it 
believed the arrangements would lead to the production of unproved 
detergents which would be available to users at better prices. 44 This 
decision was made despite the fact that Henkel and Colgate were two of 
the four largest .detergent manufacturers in the world. 
It is important to note that the Henkel-Colgate(72/241) decision 
indicates that the Commission is willing to apply its balancing logic to 
restrictive agreements between finns with substantial market power. 
Henkel, of Dusseldorf~ and Colgate-Palmolive, of New York, entered into 
an agreement to coordinate their development projects in the area of 
certain laundry soaps and detergents. 
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At the time of the agreement, the market structure in the soap and 
detergent industry was highly oligopolistic. In the Common Market 
Proctor and Gamble, Unilever, Henkel, and Colgate-Palmolive accounted 
for BO percent of the total sales. Henkel and Colgate-Palmolive had 
approximately 37 percent of the detergent market. Despite the 
oligopolistic market structure, the Commission gr.anted the agreement an 
exemption from prohibition on the grounds that j oint research between 
the parties should promote technical and economic progress. The 
Commission reasoned that the sharing of research expenses created the 
expectation of rlgreater results." 
The Collllllission believed consumers would receive a fair share of the 
advantages of the cooperation because of the likelihood of a greater 
supply of technically-improved products. Furthermore, the Comnission 
explained that, in its view, competition was not j eopardized because the 
contracting parties did not have a dominant market position in the 
relevant products within the Conununity. 
Lower product prices are one way in which the stipulation that 
benefits from restrictive agreements be passed . to consumers can be 
satisfied. The Comnission, however, has found that there ·are other 
results which may benefit the public interest as much as reduced prices. 
The Commission exempted an exclusive license agreement in the 1978 
Campari (78/253) case primarily because the "restriction helped to 
concentrate the licensees' sales efforts and provided a better supply to 
45 
conswners. The result of the licensing agreement was to increase the 
quantities of Bitter Campari available to consumers through improved 
distributing, so that consumers benefited directly. 
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The benefits to consumers that the Commission recognized in its 
Clima-Chapee (69/241) decision were the increase in p~oduction and sale 
of a greater range of products, and greater product choice for 
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consumers. The rationalization of production of air conditioning 
equipment intended in the specialization agreement also had the 
potential of lowering production costs. Conceivably, consumers then 
stood to benefit from lower product prices. 
Agreements which have limited or restricted competition to a 
substantial degree in the Common Market have been authorized by the 
Comnission when consumers were likely to receive a fair share of the 
benefits through the development of a new or improved product. 
In a 1968 decision the Corranission authorized an agreement for 
technical cooperation and joint research and development •in an 
application for exemption by ACEC-Berliet (68/319). 47 The purpose of 
the agreement was to design and market a new type of passenger bus with 
an electrical transmission system. It provided for specialization and 
division of labor in research as well as manufacture. The agreement 
contained provisions which restricted free trade between member states 
because it limited the number of buyers to one per EEC country. 
Nevertheless, the Commission granted the agreement an exemption because 
it fulfilled the conditions of Article 85 (3). 
The agreement promoted technical and economic progress because the 
joint research was likely to produce a bus with simplified mechanical 
construction and better performance capabilities. Consumers' share of 
the profits (i.e., benefits to operators of motor coach lines) was 
judged to be the probability that a new product would become available 
more quickly as a result of the joint technical operation. The decision 
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was the Commission's first in which it decided that an evaluation of 
consumer benefits could be based upon the probability that beneficial 
effects would result. 
Since the ACEC-Berliet (68/319) decision, th .e Comm:ission has 
exempted other agreements because of the . likelihood that consumers would 
benefit from the production of a new product. In 1977, the two leading 
manufacturers of switchgear apparatus in the United Kingdom received an 
exemption for an agreement to design, manufacture and sell a new type of 
circuit breaker. In Vacuum Interrupters (77/160) the Commission decided 
that the agreement was likely to result in a more durable and efficient 
. . b k f . abl · 48 c1.rcu1.t rea er or consumers at a more reason e price. The 
Commission also noted in this decision the potential for the agreement 
to put the switchgear industry in the EEC in a better position to meet 
future competition in this product from outside the EEC. 
An agreement to do joint medical research was sanctioned by the 
commission in its 1979 Beecham/Parke Davis (79/298) decision. 49 Once 
again, the primary justification for the authorization of the 
anti-competitive arrangements was the probability of benefits to 
consumers from a new product. The joint research and development 
agreement was designed to create a new medicine for the long-term 
treatment of the impairment of blood circulation. Thus, consumers stood 
to gain benefits from the development of a new medicine. 
It is essential that parties seeking an exemption under Article 85 
(3) assure · the Commission that consumers are likely to receive a fair 
share of the benefits resulting from the anti-canpetitive arrangements. 
It is necessary to satisfy this condition in all cases, and it may be a 
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sufficient justification individually for an exemption in sane 
situations. (e.g., the Campari (78/253) decision). The Comnission may 
impose specific requirements on the parties involved to insure that 
consumer benefits are manifested. Also, the fact that individual 
exemptions are granted for a specified period of time and are subject to 
review, increases the probability that enterprises will make benefits 
effective for consumers. 
The preceding analysis of the individual exemption process under 
Article 85 (3) provides a fundamental link between the Schumpeter-Clark 
model of competition and EEC competition policy. It is highly possible 
that this provision, which grants exemptions from the ban on restrictive 
practices, is the statute most indicative of the EEC attitude towards 
competition. 
The exemptions allowed under Article 85 (3) manifest the historical 
European approach to concerted practices and concentrations. No 
inherent fear of concerted practices or dominant positions is reflected. 
Rather than proscribing the existence of market structures or activities, 
the policy attempts in a realistic way to promote competition and ensure 
that consumers receive a fair share of the benefits. 
The cases that were presented support this contention. The 
litigation is evidence that the EEC desires a system of competition 
which promotes modernization of the production, even if it comes from 
rationalization agreements which are restrictive by nature. Also, the 
COllmUnity's approach is to encourage the development of new or improved 
products or production techniques. Joint research and ·development, 
joint production, and specialization agreements are sanctioned to 
promote such technical and economic advances. Even a new industry 
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(nuclear fuel reprocessing ) was created in the United Reprocessor 
76/248 case, despite its monopolistic features, because it organized the 
. 50 industry in the most rational manner at the European level. 
Thus, Article 85 (3) mandates a flexible, realistic approach to EEC 
competition policy. The Commission and Court enforce the rules in a 
manner which encourages the efficiency of large-scale production and the 
benefits stemming from modernization. The process of individual 
exemptions is clearly exemplary of the EEC concern for effective 
competition and is indicative of a rational, pragmatic competition 
policy. This approach is consistent with the Schumpeter-Clark model of 
competition. 
Article 86 of the Rome Treaty is directed towards preventing the 
abuse of economic power by enterprises with a dominant market position. 
It does not proscribe the existence or acquisition of market power, but 
states that "any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position within the Common Market or in a substantial part of it shall 
be prohibited as incompatible within the Common Market insofar as it may 
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affect trade between member states." • The Article prohibits a 
non-exhaustive list of abusive practices (e.g., unfair prices, 
production limits, or restraints on technological development) if they 
are undertaken by a firm with a dominant market position and the 
activity affects trade between member states. 
That which is not proscribed by Article 86 is as important to EEC 
competition as the practices that are prohibited. Article 86 does not 
prohibit the existence of market power in any form. Monopolies and 
cartels are not declared illegal by the statute. Neither does the 
Article prohibit the acquisition of a dominant market position, i.e., 
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monopolizing. In other words, Article 86 is not designed to prohibit or 
limit the degree of market power in the EEC, but to control the abuse of 
economic power. 
Enterprises which restrict competition but meet certain conditions 
can be granted exemptions under Article 85 (3). However, there is no 
exemption clause similar to 85 (3) under Article 86. To some extent 
these factors have made Article 86 the more flexible of the two treaty 
statutes. The result has been more restrained enforcement and 
substantive development of Article 86 as an integral rule of competition 
policy in EEC. 
There are two main issues which must be resolved by the Conmission 
in order to apply Article 86. One consideration is with structural 
competition. This issue involves the legal issue of the existence of a 
dominant position. The second issue involves the behavioral aspects 
of competition because a determination must be made of whether an abuse 
of power exists. 
The determination of whether a firm possesses dominant market power 
hinges on whether the firm has a significant degree of influence in a 
well-defined geographic and product market. The Commission nrust 
determine that a firm holds the dominant position ·in a specific market 
before the question of abusive behavior is considered. 
The determination of a dominant market power is made in the EEC by 
considering a firm's relative size or market shar ,e, the coDD11and it 
has over technological expertise, its control over raw materials and 
capital, and the market position of competitors. The Court of 
Justice decided in Continental Can (6/72) that a dominant position 
exists when a firm has the power to behave independently and act without 
id i t 't h 1· 52 cons er ng compe 1 ors, pure asers, or supp iers. 
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No exact percentage of market share has been determined which 
automatically indicates a dominant position. For example, in United 
Brands (76/353) it was determined that dominance in the market for 
bananas existed because of the cumulative effect of advantages the -firm 
enjoyed, even though the firm had less than 45\ of the determined 
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relevant market. However, in other significant cases decided under 
Article 86, nearly 80% of the relevant market share was necessary to 
constitute the requisite degree of control. The table below indicates 
those cases and the market shares that were considered dominant. 
THE CRITERION OF DOMINANT MARKET POSITION UNDER ARTICLE 86 
Firm 
Re Gema (German Performers' 
Rights Society (71/224) 
Coumercial Solvents (73/7) 
General Motors Continental 
(75/267) 
Continental Cari (72/6) 
Continental Can (76/6) 
Continental Can (72/6) 
Sugar Cartel (73/ 40) 
Sugar Cartel (73/111) 
Product Market 
Share 
Supply of recording services 100\ 
aminobutanol-ethanebutol 100\ 
Issuance of "confornid,ty 
certificates" 100\ 
Meat tins 70-80\ 
Fish trns 80-90\ 
Metal caps 50-55\ 
Sugar beets 85\ 
Raw sugar 90-95\ 
The pattern of requiring such a large percentage of market share to 
establish market dominance has reduced significantly the number of cases 
which may have infringed Article 86. The approach taken by the 
Commission and Court to establishing dominance adds credibility to the 
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belief that the EEC's main concern is for effective competition, not 
market structures. 
The Court of Justice established the importance of an accurate 
assessment of the relevant product market in Continental Can (72/6). 
The Commission detenni.ned that the Americar, fim possessed a dominant 
position in the German national market for light metal containers and 
certain metal tops, and that its purchase of 80 percent of a Dutch 
enterprise was a violation of Article 86 because it virtually eliminated 
competition in a substantial part of the Comnon Market. The Commission 
considered the relevant product market to be the German market for metal 
containers, and thus only directly competing metal containers were 
included in the analysis. 
The appeal to the Court of Justice resulted in an annulment of the 
Commission's decision. The Court felt that the Commission did not 
"sufficiently explain the fact and appraisalson . t:he [the decision] was 
54 based. " In particular, the Commission fai _led to make clear why the 
markets for meat ~d fish tins, and metal tops should be treated 
separately and independent of the general market for light containers. 
Thus, although the market . shares were 75, 85, and 55 percent, 
respectively, the Court believed the Commission should have considered 
existing or potential competition from substitute materials such as 
plastic and glass. 
By virtue of the Court's decision in the Continental Can case, a 
full market power analysis is required to establish market dominance. 
Products which are more than to a limited extent interchangeable must be 
included within the same market. The selection of the appropriate 
product and geographic market is a key in determining whether a dominant 
position exists. 
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The result of the Court's decision in the Continental Can (72/6) 
case is that the determination of the relevant product market under 
Article 86 must include actual and potential competition. An 
implication of the Court's action for competitive policy is that the 
inclusion of potential competition in the relevant product market 
analysis substantially broadens the competitive product area and reduces 
the probability of a firm being in a dominant market position. Thus, 
the application of Article 86 is more difficult for the Com:nission, 
because it must be able to prove that an enterprise can operate totally 
independent of suppliers, consumers, as well as existing and future 
competitors. 
As stated, there are behavioral elements which must be determined 
in order to apply Article 86. In other words, once dominance in a 
relevant market has been established the Commission must decide whether 
an exploitation of that power has occurred. It should again be noted 
that existence of dominance is not an infringement of Article 86. 
Market power is merely the first criterion necessary to establish if an 
abuse of power has taken place. It is this abusive behavior which is 
considered contrary to Article 86. 
Of course many types of behavior may ultimately violate the 
intentions of the competition rules. To date, however, the abuses 
prohibited have fallen into the following categories: 
l. the imposition of unfair terms and conditions upon members of 
an association in charge of the exploitation of music 
performing rights (Re Gema 71/229): 
2. a merger which has as its effect to substantially lessen 
competition (Continental Can 72/6); 
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3. a refusal to supply goods to a customer (Commercial Solvents 
73/7) 1 
4. the charging of excessive prices (General Motors 75/26): 
5. discriminatory pricing (United Brands 76/26); 
6. the imposition of exclusive purchase obiligations 
(Hoffman-La Roche 76/85): 
7. a disciminatory reduction in supplies to certain customers 
(European Sugar Cartel 73/50). 
The varied nature of the abusive behavior proscribed in the cases 
heretofore suggests the capability of a flexible approach in applying 
Article 86. The definition of what constitutes an abuse has essentially 
been determined on a case by case basis. Such an open-ended approach to 
abuse may serve the needs of the Community well. The result of this 
approach is that "one is ieft with the conclusion that abuses occur 
where the Commission finds them to exist. This [can be] a deterrent to 
firms with market power in their relations with suppliers, purchasers, 
d . 55 an competitors. 
In sununary, the Conmunity has the ability to prevent or eliminate 
the abuses of dominant market power under Article 86. However, the 
Community preference for regulating restrictive p.ractices, rather than 
prohibiting dominant market structures, is evidenced in the enforcement 
of Article 86 . and indicative of the control of 'abuse of power 
competition principle. 
Summary and Implications for Future Policy 
An examination of the competition policy implemented in the EEC 
indicates that the Community attempts through its policy to achieve 
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supranational economic objectives, and control the abusive use of 
economic power. The balancing logic that authorities employ requires 
that potential social and economic benefits (e.g., new products, im-
proved production techniques, and more efficient forms of industrial 
organization) be measured in relation to the costs of anti-competitive 
activities. It was resolved in this study that the basic standard by 
which imperfectly competitive practices are judged is economic per-
formance; a criterion which primarily emphasizes contributions to 
efficiency enhancement and technological progress. In other words, 
canmunity competition authorities attempt to balance the tradeoff 
between static efficiency and the benefits of dynamic progressiveness. 
This study concludes that EEC competition policy is a pragmatic 
policy designed to foster innovational competition and provide benefits 
to the Common Market from a dynamic economic system. Furthermore, the 
research indicates that the Schumpeter-Clark model of competition 
provides a logical theoretical framework for the analysis and explana-
tion of the policy. 
Future Policy Implications 
The conclusions of this study have realistic implications for 
future EEC policy decisions, and for other research directions. 
Presently, the EEC is investigating the practices of two U.S. 
firms; IBM and Reynolds Tobacco Co. IBM has been accused by its 
European competitors of abusing its dominant market position. The 
Reynolds investigation is concerned with the impact on EEC tobacco 
markets of the U.S. firm's purchase of 22 percent in Rothmans 
International of London. 
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European manufacturers of computer equipment contend that IBM's 
refusal to disclose technical details of interface components precludes 
them from developing and selling memory devices that are plug-compatible 
with IBM computers. IBM has countered by arguing that if their lead 
time is reduced, the company's incentive to be innovative will be 
diminished. Assuming the political ramifications of the firms being 
American are minimal, the interpretation of competition precedents and 
the proposed economic principles of policy presented in this study can 
be useful for predicting an outcome. Assuredly, the Commission's 
decision in the IBM case will hinge upon the firm's promotion of 
technological progress and the benefits that EEC consumers receive from 
the advances. 
In the Reynolds-Rothmans' agreement, the Commission is interested 
in the possible creation of a dominant market position, and the 
potential for the abuse of the accompanying economic power. The 
findings of this rese~rch are that the control of concentrations falls 
within -the ambit of Article 86, and that the priority of effective 
competition has precluded its application to the existence of economic 
power. The most notable precedent in this area is the Court of 
Justice's decision in the Continental Can Case (6/72). The Court ruled 
that the Commission must make a thorough evaluation of all the relevant 
facts, including substitute goods and potential competition. 
It is hoped that this study of competition legislation and policy 
by the EEC, and the model presented as its theoretical foundation will 
prove useful for the explanation and prediction of the future direction 
of EEC canpetition policy. 
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